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able to discover flaws in a canonical cryptographic protocol by Needham and Schroeder and two security
protocols specific to sensor networks. We also demonstrate that a protocol aware intrusion model
automatically generated by Slede incurs a small extra cost compared to models handwritten by model
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ABSTRACT
Sensor networks are often deployed in hostile situations. A number
of protocols are being developed to secure these networks. Current
means to verify these protocols include simulation, manual inspec-
tion, and running them on sensor network testbeds. These tech-
niques leave room for subtle errors in protocol implementations
that can be exploited by adversaries. The contribution of this work
is the design, implementation and early evaluation of a domain-
specific verification framework for nesC implementations of sen-
sor network security protocols. We call our verification framework
Slede. Technical underpinnings of Slede include support for auto-
matic extraction of PROMELA models from nesC source code, an
annotation language to guide the verification process, and an au-
tomatic intrusion model generator. Preliminary evaluation shows
that Slede was able to discover flaws in a canonical cryptographic
protocol by Needham and Schroeder and two security protocols
specific to sensor networks. We also demonstrate that a protocol
aware intrusion model automatically generated by Slede incurs a
small extra cost compared to models handwritten by model check-
ing experts. By automating a significant portion of the verification
process, Slede promises to make it easier to apply finite-state model
checking to verify nesC protocol implementations.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.2.4 [Software/Program Verification]: Formal Methods; D.2.4
[Software/Program Verification]: Model Checking; F.3.1
[Specifying and Verifying and Reasoning about Programs]:
Mechanical verification, Specification technique
General Terms
Security, Verification
Keywords
sensor networks, security protocols, model checking, slede, intru-
sion model generation
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1. INTRODUCTION
A sensor network is a collection of small size, low power, low-
cost sensor nodes that has some computational, communication and
storage capacity. These nodes can operate unattended, sensing and
recording detailed information about their surroundings. The inno-
vation in wireless networking coupled with the effect of Moore’s
law is making these networks attractive for many civil and mili-
tary applications [1] such as target tracking, remote surveillance,
and habitat monitoring. The operating environments of sensor net-
works are often hostile, requiring mechanisms for secure commu-
nication. In particular, messages containing missions or queries
disseminated by administrators [25], control or data messages for
decentralized collaborations, etc, need to be secure. A number of
security protocols for sensor networks have been proposed in the
past decade (see [6] for a survey).
Flaws in security protocols are subtle and very hard to find. In
the past, even widely-studied cryptographic protocols are shown to
have faults that are detected much later (e.g. see [9, 44, 33]). Find-
ing flaws in the security protocol implementations is even harder
because they tend to be more complex compared to abstract proto-
col specifications [18]. Moreover, often just verifying the protocol
specification (model) is not sufficient due to frequently found gaps
between the model and its implementation [3]. Analyzing the im-
plementation of protocols is important to guarantee that there are
no discrepancies between the specification and the implementation
of the protocol.
Verifying sensor network security protocol implementations is
even harder primarily due to two reasons. First, these implemen-
tations are more complex because the security protocols for sensor
networks protect against more cryptographic failure modes com-
pared to their counterparts. Second, these implementations are
developed for a severely resource constrained environment. Effi-
ciency and code size is more likely to weigh over readability and
understandability, which in turn increases the likelihood of incon-
sistencies and errors.
Verification techniques that are commonly employed by the sen-
sor network community include simulating the protocol implemen-
tation using a commonly used simulator called TOSSIM [29], man-
ual inspection of the protocol code, and test runs of the protocol
implementation on sensor network test beds. Considering that sen-
sor networks are often deployed in critical scenarios, the current
techniques for verification leave room for subtle errors and vulner-
abilities in protocol implementations.
Model checking as a verification technique has shown significant
potential in recent years [2, 17]. In particular, model checkers that
take source code as input such as Java path finder [20], Bandera
[12], etc, make this technology more accessible to a broader audi-
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module CompM {
provides interface StdControl;
uses interface Timer;
}
implementation {
command result_t StdControl.init() {...}
event result_t Timer.fired() {...}
}
configuration Comp {
}
implementation {
components Main, CompM, SingleTimer;
Main.StdControl -> CompM.StdControl;
CompM.Timer -> SingleTimer.Timer;
...
}
Figure 1: A NesC Example
ence. As Dwyer et al. [41] state, “the level of knowledge and effort
required ... currently prevents many domain experts, who are not
necessarily experts in model-checking, from successfully applying
model checking to systems and software analysis problems”. In this
work we describe our framework Slede, which is meant to address
this problem for sensor network applications.
Slede allows for more rigorous verification of sensor network se-
curity protocol implementations written in nesC [16], a dominant
language for the sensor networks paradigm. Key contributions of
this work include: an approach for automatic extraction of veri-
fiable models from nesC applications, an annotation language to
guide the verification process, a technique for automatic generation
of intrusion models, and an industrial strength tool that embodies
these techniques.
To evaluate we have verified an authentication protocol by Need-
ham and Schroeder [37], a commonly used example in the protocol
verification community. We compared Slede’s performance with
an intruder model by Maggi and Sisto [31], highly customized for
Needham Schroeder protocol. We have also verified two security
protocols designed for sensor networks. The first protocol was for
establishing pairwise keys in sensor networks [48] and one-way key
chain based one-hop broadcast authentication scheme [50]. Slede
confirmed known flaws in both these protocols.
The rest of this work describes our approach in detail. To make
it self-contained, in the next section we briefly describe the nesC
language. A basic familiarity with an imperative programming lan-
guage such as C is assumed. Section 3 describes our model extrac-
tion methodology, our intrusion model generation technique, and
our verification framework Slede. In order to automatically gen-
erate the intrusion model, our framework requires users to provide
information about the protocol message structures and sequence of
message exchanged using an annotation language. Section 3 also
describes the key constructs of this language. Section 4 describes
the results of applying our verification process to a selection of sen-
sor network protocols. Section 5 discusses related work. Section 6
describes future work and Section 7 concludes.
2. THE NESC LANGUAGE
nesC [16] is an extension of the C language designed to develop
sensor network applications. nesC applications consists of mod-
ules, interfaces and configurations. nesC modules are similar to
early Ada and ML modules in that they cannot be instantiated, but
they serve as containers. A module can contain state declarations
(shared by other elements of the modules), command declarations
(methods) and event handlers. An event handler is similar to a
method; yet, it is executed only when the event is triggered. An
interface is a collection of related commands/events. A module
that provides an interface has to implement its commands, while a
module that uses an interface has to implement its events.
An example module in nesC is shown in Figure 1. Module
CompM provides interface StdControl, so it has to implement
the interface commands (e.g. StdControl.init()). CompM
also uses the interface Timer, so it has to implement its events
(e.g. Timer.fired). A configuration component is responsible
for connecting the components that are using interfaces to the com-
ponents that provide their implementation. For example, compo-
nent Main uses interface StdControl and is wired to component
CompM. Every application has a single top-level configuration.
3. VERIFICATION FRAMEWORK
In this section, we describe Slede. Slede is a domain-specific
model checking framework for sensor network security protocol
implementations in nesC. It features new mechanisms for extract-
ing PROMELA models from nesC implementations and for gener-
ating intrusion models from protocol specifications. The descrip-
tion includes the main components of Slede, namely front-end,
protocol model generator, intrusion model generator, environment
model library, intruder template library, and counter-example trans-
lator as shown in Figure 2.
3.1 Slede’s Front-end
The front-end of our framework accepts the complete nesC lan-
guage and our annotation language (described in the next section).
We have modified the nesC compiler to suit our task [38]. The
modifications were limited to the parsing phase and the code gen-
eration phase. We left the semantic analysis intact so that a syn-
tactic and/or semantic error in the nesC compiler is also a syntactic
and/or semantic error in Slede and verification is only attempted on
protocol implementations free of compile-time errors.
The front-end generates an abstract syntax tree of the protocol
implementation, which is then passed to the protocol model gen-
erator, which is responsible for automatically extracting verifiable
PROMELA models [22].
It is widely understood that model checkers suffer from two
problems, namely state space explosion and environment model-
ing (or environment generation). The state space explosion refers
to exponential increase in the state space explored as the model
size increases, whereas environment modeling refers to the process
of developing a representation for the parts of the system that are
not being analyzed. State space explosion problem is generally ad-
dressed by better abstractions and also by automated abstraction
generation [11]. The environment modeling issues are alleviated
by automated generation techniques [24, 46].
Slede decreases the extent of these problems for its intended do-
main, although it does not completely solve it. The state space
explosion problem is addressed by providing a lightweight annota-
tion language that can be used to provide hints to the verification
framework. Environment modeling issue is addressed by providing
a library of environment models such as for sending and receiving
messages, sensing environmental changes, etc.
In order to verify a protocol implementation, besides the source
code, Slede requires an abstract specification of the protocol, a de-
ployment topology, and properties that need to be verified about the
protocol. The protocol specification is used to automatically gener-
ate an intrusion model customized to the protocol. The deployment
topology is needed to bound the generated state space. Slede pro-
vides an annotation language for this task. In the next subsection,
we describe this annotation language.
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Figure 2: Overview of the Slede Verification Framework
3.2 Annotations in Slede
In this section, we describe the annotation language for Slede.
The description includes syntax, small examples, and informal se-
mantics of the constructs.
The abstract syntax of our annotation language is shown in Fig-
ure 3. A verification configuration (V) consists of a sequence of
message declarations (mdecl*), followed by a sequence of node
definitions (ndecl*), followed by protocol definition (pdef ), fol-
lowed by an objective. The objective is the property that is to be
verified about the protocol with respect to the specified configura-
tion. We explain message declarations, node definitions, and other
pieces of the syntax in the following subsections.
In the concrete syntax, the verification configuration is defined
in comments as shown in Figure 4. The annotation comments start
and end with an at-sign (@) similar to the annotation comments for
the JML specifications [28]. The special words such as message
are not keywords; they only have special meanings in this context.
The verification configuration could also be specified as a com-
mand line option for the framework, or as an XML file.
3.2.1 Message declarations
A verification configuration in Slede’s annotation language may
contain a sequence of message declarations that represent messages
exchanged between nodes. A message declaration has exactly one
message type (mtype) named in the header message mtype, fol-
lowed by the keyword mapsto, followed by t, which is a structure
defined in the implementation that is used for exchanging messages
between principals. The mapsto clause establishes a correspon-
dence between the protocol specification and implementation.
A message declaration may contain a sequence of terms (term*).
A term is a type, followed by a term name, which can be one of
the special words {sender, receiver, key, nonce, secret, data},
followed by the keyword mapsto, followed by f or a modifier
followed by a message type (mtype) followed by a message name
(msg), followed by the keyword mapsto, followed by f . The f is a
field in the structure defined in the implementation that is used for
exchanging messages between principals. The types of fields that
are mapped to each other should be the same.
V ::= mdecl* ndef* pdef o
mdecl ::= message mtype mapsto t { term* }
term ::= t tname mapsto f ;
| modifier mtype msg mapsto f ;
modifier ::= private | public
ndef ::= node nt n { rdef* }
rdef ::= n; | nt;
pdef ::= protocol p { mexch* }
mexch ::= (nt,nt:mtype)
o ::= true | false | condition | ! o | (o) | o && o | o ‘||’ o
| []o | <>o | o->o| o<->o
condition ::= t n.i (form*)
form ::= t var, where var3 N ∪ CT ∪ NT
p ∈ P, the set of protocol names
m,n ∈ N , the set of node names
mtype ∈ MT , the set of message types
i, j ∈ I, the set of event and command names
tname ∈ {sender, receiver, key, nonce, secret, data}
msg ∈ M, the set of message names
s, t ∈ T , the set of types in implementation
e, f ∈ F , the set of field names in implementation
mt, nt ∈ NT , the set of node types in implementation
Figure 3: Abstract syntax for the core annotation language
The special term names are selected to help during the intrusion
model generation. A modifier can be public or private (with
the default value as public). It is considered a violation for an
intruder to be able to read the private parts of the message.
Note that all terms in mtypemust have a corresponding field in t.
More than one mtypes can be mapped to one t. The set of fields in
t must be a union of the set of fields in all such mtypes.
An example message declaration is given in Figure 4 (lines 11-
14), where a message type Ack is defined. This message type in
specification is mapped to the structure IntMsg in the implemen-
tation. The example defines that a message of this type will contain
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1 /*@
2 @ message Nonce mapsto MAC {
3 @ int nonce mapsto cipher;
4 @ int key mapsto key;
5 @ }
6 @ message Ping mapsto IntMsg{
7 @ int sender mapsto src;
8 @ int receiver mapsto dest;
9 @ private Nonce data mapsto data;
10 @ }
11 @ message Ack mapsto IntMsg{
12 @ int sender mapsto src;
13 @ int receiver mapsto dest;
14 @ }
15 @ node SensorM A{ }
16 @ node SensorM B{ A; }
17 @ protocol p {
18 @ (SensorM, SensorM, Ping)
19 @ (SensorM, SensorM, Ack)
20 @ }
21 @ A.snd(Ping m)-><>B.rcvd(Ping m)
22 @*/
Figure 4: An Example Verification Configuration
two integer fields representing the sender and the receiver of the ac-
knowledgement. These fields are mapped to fields src and dest
of the structure IntMsg.
The message declaration Ping in Figure 4 is an example of a
compound message that is also mapped to the structure IntMsg
in implementation. This example shows that two different mes-
sage types may be implemented using the same structure in the
implementation. Ping contains a private field of type Nonce.
The message type Nonce in turn consists of two special integer
fields nonce and key. The way to read this message declaration
is “Pingmessage contains sender address, receiver address,
and a nonce encrypted with key”.
Slede’s annotation language semantics also follow the same rule.
When a message type such as Ping contains a private field of
another message type such as Nonce that contains a field key, it is
assumed that the compound message will have a portion encrypted
with the key. Here a message of type Nonce will contain nonce
encrypted with key. For the rest of this paper, we will omit the
mapsto clause, assuming similar structures of messages in speci-
fication and implementation.
3.2.2 Node definitions
A verification configuration in Slede may contain one or more
node definitions. A node definition has exactly one node type (nt)
named in the header node nt n. This node type must be defined
in the implementation that is being verified. It may declare several
reachability definitions (rdef*).
A reachability definition is one of the two possible reachability
tuples. The simplest kind specifies the concrete node name n. This
definition means that the node n is reachable from the current node.
The second kind nt does not specify the concrete node name, only
its type, which means that any node of type nt is reachable from
the current node. A simple node definition is presented in Figure 4
(lines 15,16). Here, nodes A and B are defined. The definition of A
states that B is reachable.
3.2.3 Protocol definition
A verification configuration in Slede may contain exactly one
protocol definition. A protocol definition consists of an ordered se-
quence of message exchange (mexch*). A message exchange con-
sists of a node type (nt), followed by the node type (nt), followed
by message type (mtype). The first node type specifies the nodes
that can send this message and the second node type represents the
receiver nodes that can receive. An example protocol definition is
shown in Figure 4 (lines 17-20).
3.2.4 Objectives
An objective is a linear temporal logic formula [40] with some
additional syntax. An objective can be a literal, or a negated ob-
jective (! o) enclosed in parenthesis ((o)), or opening and closing
brackets followed by an objective ([]o), which denotes always,
or opening and closing angular brackets followed by an objective
(<>o), which denotes eventually.
An objective may also consist of two sub-objectives combined
by logical and (o && o), logical or (o ‘||’ o), implication (o->o),
or equivalence (o<->o) operators. These operators have the same
meanings as their LTL counterparts and they are translated accord-
ingly. Finally, a literal can be true, false or a condition.
A condition allow objectives to be expressed in terms of com-
mands and events in the protocol implementation. For example, as-
sume that the sender src in Figure 4 declares a command snd that
takes a parameter of type Ping. The receiver dest in the same
protocol implementation registers an event handler of type rcvd
with the underlying network layer that also receives a parameter of
type Ping. A user-defined condition for a trivial property of this
implementation is shown in Figure 4 (line 21). The expressed ob-
jective means that node A sending a message m implies that node B
will receive the same message m eventually.
3.3 Protocol Model Generation
The protocol model generation phase replaces the original code
generation phase of the nesC compiler. It translates the protocol
implementation as a whole into one PROMELA process that is a
global object describing the behavior of the protocol. To generate
a finite-state model, we use the following strategies.
 Bounded principals: We use the verification topology informa-
tion provided as annotations (see Section 3.2.2) to determine the
number of principals involved in the protocol. For each principal
(node) involved in the protocol, an instance of the process is instan-
tiated. Following this strategy produces a restricted model, which
does not exhibit all behaviors of the protocol implementation; how-
ever, it has been shown that even a small version of a system can
be very useful for finding errors [26]. Moreover, deployment sce-
narios for a sensor network application (number of principals, etc)
is often known in advance and we expect verification to be per-
formed on these topologies, which further increases the likelyhood
of finding errors in the system under verification.
 Abstracting Environment: During the protocol model genera-
tion, all system calls (calls to the libraries of TinyOS) are replaced
by calls to environment models provided as Slede’s library. This re-
placement is necessary for two reasons. First, it reduces the size of
the model. Second, the TinyOS system calls should not affect the
security of the protocol. It is the protocol that we want to verify and
not the TinyOS libraries. Our library provides PROMELA models
for sending and receiving messages, LED manipulation, etc.
3.3.1 Translating Pointers and Function Symbols
One of the main hurdles in translating a security protocol’s im-
plementation to a verification language such as PROMELA is that
the protocol code usually includes many constructs that have no
equivalents in the verification languages [18]. For example, secure
hash functions, encryption and decryption techniques use a lot of
4
constructs that are far from what current verification techniques of-
fer. Also, pointer arithmetic is common in the nesC implementation
of sensor network protocols.
Our solution to this problem is based on a feature provided by
SPIN, versions 4.0 and later, that allows embedding C code inside
the PROMELA model. The global variables of every nesC mod-
ule of the protocol are included in the state vector using SPIN’s
c_state construct, and the statements of the protocol (except
for system calls) are embedded one by one as C code using the
c_code construct. Thus, no equational theories associated with
function symbols nor pointer analysis techniques are required be-
cause the operations themselves are included in the model. This
solution is efficient when the size of the protocol is small, how-
ever, when the protocol size increases, some more abstraction is re-
quired. For example, annotations on method calls to encryption/de-
cryption functions may be added similar to Goubault-Larrecq and
Parrennes’s approach [18]. In the current prototype of Slede, we
have not explored these abstraction techniques.
3.3.2 Translating Events
A module in nesC can announce and respond to events (see
Section 2). Events introduce concurrency in the language model.
Events can be signalled explicitly using the signal construct or
by the hardware interrupt. After an event is signalled it executes
asynchronously. A common problem with modeling event-driven
system is that the target of an event is often not known statically.
The expressive power of the nesC language is deliberately lim-
ited by the designers to detect target of a signalled event using a
tractable static analysis [16]. Slede uses a similar analysis to trans-
late explicitly signalled events and corresponding event handlers.
The target of the signalled event is determined, and the construct
signal is replaced by an explicit call to that target.
This solution works for the user implemented events, where the
event is signaled from the application, however, for events that are
signaled from TinyOS libraries (i.e. event handler for message re-
ceiving), this is not the case. Thus, in order to emulate the event-
based paradigm, Slede adds a statement to check for pending events
between every two statements in the model, where an event handler
may be executed [23].
3.4 Intrusion Model Generation
A key challenge in security protocol verification is selection of
the right intrusion model. Selecting the right intrusion model can
possibly reduce the state space to make the protocol implementa-
tions amenable to automatic analysis. On the other hand, selecting
an overly general model can create an infinite state space, which
may not be tackled by finite-state model checkers. Moreover, sen-
sor network researchers and developers are not model checking ex-
perts, which makes it harder for them to write effective finite-state
intrusion models in languages such as PROMELA.
Slede automates this process. It generates a Dolev-Yao style in-
trusion model [13] from the protocol specification. An intruder in
this model can intercept all messages and modify their contents, but
cannot read an encrypted message unless it has the encryption key.
The generated intrusion model is aware of protocol’s message
structure and message sequencing, which are almost always avail-
able, therefore it generates lesser state compared to a naïve intru-
sion model, but more states compared to a model that is highly
customized by a model checking expert. On the other hand, the
generated model does not require specialized efforts from Slede
users.
An intrusion model is generated as a separate PROMELA pro-
cess that describes the behavior of the intruder. The intruder can
1 bit knowsNonceA;
2 active proctype Intruder() {
3 Crypt data, saved;
4 mtype msg;
6 do
7 :: network? msg,_,data -> /* Msg Intercepted */
8 if /* perhaps store the message */
9 :: saved = data;
10 :: skip;
11 fi;
13 :: /* Replay or send message */
14 if /* choosing message type */
15 :: msg = msg1;
16 ...
17 fi;
18 if /* choosing recipient */
19 :: recipient = agentA;
20 ...
21 fi;
22 if /* replay saved msg or assemble it */
23 :: data = saved;
24 :: if
25 :: knowsNonceA -> data.info = nonceA;
26 :: data.info = 0;
27 fi;
28 fi;
29 network ! (msg,rcpt,data);
30 od;
31 }
Figure 5: Intruder Model Pattern
intercept a message, save it, forward it, discard it or create a new
message to send. Thus, the intrusion models that Slede generates
also serve to model dynamic topological changes. For example, a
broken communication link between two sensor nodes is modeled
by a non-deterministic choice in the intrusion model, where the re-
ceived message is dropped.
The pattern used for the intruder model generation is based on
the intruder model described in [34]. The structure of the intruder
is shown in Figure 5. There is one loop (lines 6-30) where the in-
truder either intercept the message (line 9), or send either the inter-
cepted message (line 23) or a new one (lines 24-27). The intruder is
allowed to save only one message, and knows about the the struc-
ture of the messages sent. These constraints on the intruder model
helps prevent the undecidability problem known to accompany the
verification of cryptographic protocols [14].
Intruder model acquires knowledge about the protocol from both
the verification configuration and the nesC implementation of the
protocol. The structure of the message in every message sequence
is described in the verification configuration, which allows the in-
truder to know what to expect in a message when it is received. For
example, in the specification shown previously in Figure 4, when
the intruder receives a message of type Ping, it knows that there is
a nonce that is encrypted (private), and it cannot open it without a
key. Yet, the sender and receiver of the Ping messages are public.
The intruder maintains a variable for every private member of
every message structure. These variables can be used in order to
describe objectives. For instance, objective that the intruder doesn’t
know the nonce in the example verification setup will be described
as {B.rcvd(Ping m) -><>!Intruder.knowsNonce}.
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3.5 Verification and Counterexamples
The generated model containing the model of the protocol im-
plementation, the intrusion model and the environment models are
given as inputs to the SPIN model checker [22], which verifies
whether the model violates the objectives which have been trans-
lated into LTL formulas [40]. If the objectives are satisfied, the
protocol is verified as secure. Otherwise, SPIN produces a counter
example that violates the security objectives. This counter example
is then translated to a sequence of nesC statements. The protocol
verification may not terminate if the PROMELAmodel is too large.
3.5.1 Translation of Objectives
Objectives in Slede are represented using command calls, event
signals, and intruder’s state. For every command, event or intruder
state, which is of interest, a boolean variable is maintained. These
variables are initialized to false. On entering a command or event
handler of interest, the corresponding variable is set. As for the
objective itself, it is translated into a linear temporal logic (LTL)
formula.
4. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate Slede. First we describe a compar-
ison of the intrusion model generation technique of Slede with a
hand-written model and with a generic intrusion model. We then
describe verification of two sensor network security protocol im-
plementations using Slede. For both protocols, Slede was able to
find flaws in the implementation. All experiments described in this
section were conducted on a Dell PowerEdge 1850 with dual 3.8
GHz processors and 2 GB RAM. The version of SPIN used for
these experiments was 4.2.7.
4.1 Intrusion Model Generation Technique
In this section, we evaluate the state space generated by Slede
with the state space generated using a general intrusion model that
is not aware of protocol structure and an intrusion model written
by a model checking expert. We selected the Needham Schroeder’s
protocol [37] for this experiment.
The objective of this protocol is to exchange two secret numbers
between two principals. Figure 6 shows the sequence of messages
in this protocol. Principal A encrypts its randomly generated secret
number called Nonce Na and its name using the public key of B,
so only B can decrypt it using its own private key. After receiving
and decrypting the message, principal B encrypts its Nonce Nb and
its partner nonce Na using A’s public key and sends it back to A.
Principal A decrypts the message, receives the partner’s nonce, en-
crypts it and sends it back to B. The two principals now share the
nonces Na and Nb.
Msg1. A -> B : {Na,A}pubkB
Msg2. B -> A : {Na,Nb}pubkA
Msg3. A -> B : {Nb} pubkB
Figure 6: Needham-Schroeder Protocol
The Needham-Schroeder protocol has a known flaw. If a mali-
cious node I communicating with node A impersonates A and es-
tablishes a connection with another node B, B will believe that it
is communicating with A and will share its secret key with A. The
malicious node I will become aware of this secret key. This vio-
lates the protocol objective that the secret numbers should only be
known to the two nodes.
The selection of this protocol for evaluation was primarily be-
cause a number of hand-written intrusion models are available. As
far as we are aware of, any intruder model for a sensor network se-
curity protocol is not available in the current literature. The intruder
model was taken from Maggi and Sisto’s work on model checking
cryptographic protocols [31].
The verification configuration for Slede’s version is shown in
Figure 7. Three compound message types EncryptedNonce,
EncryptedNonceNode, and EncryptedNonceNonce are
declared. A message of type EncryptedNonce contains
sender address, receiver address, and a nonce encrypted
with key. A message of type EncryptedNonceNode con-
tains sender address, receiver address, and a nonce
and the sender address encrypted with key, and a message
of type EncryptedNonceNonce contains sender address,
receiver address, and two nonces encrypted with key.
1 /*@
2 @ message Nonce {
3 @ int nonce; int key;
4 @ }
5 @ message EncryptedNonce{
6 @ int sender; int receiver;
7 @ private Nonce data;
8 @ }
9 @ message NonceNode{
10 @ int nonce; int sender; int key;
11 @ }
12 @ message EncryptedNonceNode {
13 @ int sender; int receiver;
14 @ private NonceNode data;
15 @ }
16 @ message NonceNonce{
17 @ int nonce; int nonce; int key;
18 @ }
19 @ message EncryptedNonceNonce {
20 @ int sender; int receiver;
21 @ private NonceNonce data
22 @ }
23 @ node NeedhamM A{ }
24 @ node NeedhamM B{ A; }
25 @ protocol Needham {
26 @ (NeedhamM, NeedhamM, EncryptedNonceNode)
27 @ (NeedhamM, NeedhamM, EncryptedNonceNonce)
28 @ (NeedhamM, NeedhamM, EncryptedNonce)
29 @ }
30 @ [] ((Leds.greenOn()) ->
31 @ (<> (!Intruder.knowNonceA || !Intruder.knowNonceB)))
32 @*/
Figure 7: Verification Setup for Needham Schroeder’s proto-
col [37]
This verification configuration contains only two nodes A and B.
Both these nodes run the code for the NeedhamM module in the
implementation. The protocol Needham is defined in terms
of declared message types and node types and it represents the se-
quence of messages exchanged between two symmetric principals.
The objective in this configuration states that when both the nodes
share the nonces (representing by the turning on the green LEDs in
the implementation) then the intruder does not know either nonces.
Figure 8 shows the states explored, transitions, and memory
taken by the same version of SPIN for three different intrusion
models. All experiments were run on the same machine. All three
intrusion models were trying to find flaws in the same protocol im-
plementation.
The second column contains the results for the intrusion model
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Hand-written
intrusion model
Slede generated
intrusion model
Generic intru-
sion model
States 692 1647 5000000
States % 42.02 100 303582.27
Transitions 5536 13082 7000000
Transitions % 42.32 100 53508.64
Memory (MB) 2.83 3.24 1800
Memory % 87.36 100 55624.23
Time fraction of sec-
ond
fraction of sec-
ond
120 seconds
and more
Figure 8: Comparsion of hand-written, generated, and generic
intrusion models for Needham Schroeder Protocol
described by Maggi and Sisto [31]. The third column shows the re-
sults for the intrusion model generated using the protocol specifica-
tion provided as annotations to Slede, and the fourth column shows
the results for a generic intrusion model. As can be observed, the
hand-written intrusion model generates 58% fewer states and tran-
sitions but only consumes only about 12% less memory.
These results demonstrate that for a small extra cost, our tech-
nique for automatically generating intrusion models has the po-
tential to make the formal verification techniques based on finite-
state model checking more accessible to sensor network security
researchers and developers, who may not be model checking ex-
perts. Our intrusion model generation technique also has room for
improvements, which is likely to lower the gap between a hand-
written model and an auto-generated intrusion model even further.
4.2 Verification of the One-way Key Chain
Based One-hop Broadcast Authentication
Scheme
The one-way key chain based one-hop broadcast authentication
scheme was proposed by Zhu et al. [50]. During the initialization
step of this protocol, every node (denoted as A) generates a one-
way key chain of certain length; that is, kn, kn−1 = h(kn) , · · · ,
k1 = h
n−1(kn), k0 = hn(kn), where h(.) is a secure hash func-
tion.
The protocol then proceeds as follows: A transmits the first key
of the key chain (i.e., k0) to each neighbor separately, encrypted
with the pairwise key shared between A and this neighbor. When
A broadcasts its first message m0, the message is authenticated
with k1; that is, m0 is broadcast with message authentication code
(MAC) h(m0, k1). After the broadcast, k1 is released alone or
with the next broadcast message, which is authenticated with the
next key in the key chain (i.e., k2). To generalize, the ith message
mi is broadcast along with h(mi, ki+1), and ki+1 is released after
the broadcast.
One known attack [50] to the above scheme is as follows: First,
the adversary prevents a neighbor of A (denoted as B) from re-
ceiving the packet from A directly. This can be achieved by, for
example, transmitting to B at the same time when A is transmit-
ting messagemi and when A is releasing authentication key ki+1.
Second, the adversary sends a modified packet to B while imper-
sonating A. Note that, the adversary has already got the released
authentication key before transmitting the modified message to B,
hence B will will accept the modified packet.
To defend against an outsider (not a neighbor of A) from launch-
ing the above attack, the original authentication scheme can be en-
hanced as follows: A shares a cluster key KC with all its neigh-
bors; when A broadcasts messagemi, the MAC of the message will
be h(mi, ki+1XORKC). However, the defense will not be useful
if the adversary has has obtainedKC by compromising A [50].
We verified an implementation of this protocol with respect to a
property informally stated as follows: “when nodes share the se-
cret, the intruder shouldn’t know about the secret.” The verification
setup including the verified property is shown in Figure 9 using
our annotation language. Like Needham-Schroeder’s protocol new
message types are declared, nodes are defined, protocol sequence
is defined, and finally protocol objectives are given in terms of the
state of the implementation and the state of the automatically gen-
erated intrusion model.
1 /*@
2 @ message KeyMsg{
3 @ int sender; int receiver;
4 @ int key;
5 @ }
6 @ message Mac{
7 @ int data;
8 @ int key;
9 @ }
10 @ message DataMsg{
11 @ int sender; int receiver;
12 @ int data;
13 @ private Mac MAC;
14 @ }
15 @ node TeslaM A{ }
16 @ node TeslaM B{ A; }
17 @ protocol p {
18 @ (TeslaM, TeslaM, KeyMsg)
19 @ (TeslaM, TeslaM, DataMsg)
20 @ (TeslaM, TeslaM, KeyMsg)
21 @ }
22 @ [] ((Leds.greenOn()) -> (<> (!Intruder.knowsdata)))
23 @*/
Figure 9: Verification Configuration for One-way Key Chain
Based One-hop Broadcast Authentication Scheme [50]
Our approach was able to detect this attack. In order to detect this
flaw using the model generated by Slede, SPIN produced 239933
states, made 1.9 million transitions, consumed 118.129 MB mem-
ory and took 17 seconds to detect the problem.
4.3 Verifying the Probabilistic Based Pairwise
Key Establishment protocol
The probabilistic based pairwise key establishment protocol [49]
includes two phases: system initialization before network deploy-
ment and pairwise key establishment after deployment. Before the
deployment of a network, i.e., during a key pre-distribution phase,
every node is loaded with a small fraction of keys out of a large
pool of keys by a key server. The allocation of the keys to each
node is done using a probabilistic scheme, which enables every
pair of nodes to share one or more keys with certain probability.
If two nodes share keys, then they can use these keys to encrypt
messages between them. If no direct keys are shared between the
two nodes, then the probabilistic key sharing scheme enables them
to communicate securely using logical paths obtained via a logical
path discovery. However, if the two nodes share keys, they cannot
use these keys directly in their communication because these keys
are not known exclusively to these two nodes, and there is a pos-
sibility these keys are allocated in some other nodes as well. Thus
these two nodes need to establish a new key that is shared only
between them.
In case of establishing a key between two nodes u and v sharing
keys, the protocol works as follows: Node u creates a secret key
S. Let Ruv be the keys shared between u and v. To send the key
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S, node u divides it into shares of equivalent sizes. To deliver each
share, node u computes the XORed key kenc = XOR ki, ∀ki∈Ruv ,
then encrypts each share with kenc.
1 /*@
2 @ message Mac{
3 @ int data;
4 @ int nonce;
5 @ int key;
6 @ }
7 @ message SecretMsg{
8 @ int sender; int receiver;
9 @ int data;
10 @ private Mac MAC;
11 @ }
12 @ message Nonce{
13 @ int nonce;
14 @ int key;
15 @ }
16 @ message EncryptedNonce{
17 @ int sender; int receiver;
18 @ private Nonce data;
19 @ }
20 @ node ZhuM A{ }
21 @ node ZhuM B{ A; }
22 @ protocol p {
23 @ (ZhuM, ZhuM, SecretMsg)
24 @ (ZhuM, ZhuM, EncryptedNonce)
25 @ }
26 @ [] ((Leds.greenOn()) -> (<> (!Intruder.knowsdata)))
27 @*/
Figure 10: Verification Configuration for Probabilistic Based
Pairwise Key Establishment protocol [49]
After extracting the model from the protocol implementation,
implementing an intruder model that behaves as a node that’s a part
of the protocol and has been compromised, the verification resulted
in a scenario where the secret key S will be known to the compro-
mised node. The problem is that if the compromised node had a
set of keys that when XORed will give the same key as kenc, then
the compromised node can intercept the message communication
between the two nodes, decrypt the message sent, save the content
and then encrypt it and send it again to the intended destination.
They keys of the nodes in the verification were 9 and 10, and the
compromised node had two keys of value 5 and 6, where the two
pairs have the same value when XORed. The probability of having
such a collision in the key when the network is being deployed has
been mentioned in [49], and though a small probability, SPIN was
able to detect it from the extracted model. The verification setup
including the verified property is shown in Figure 10 using our an-
notation language. SPIN produced 2040 states, made 603050 tran-
sitions, consumed 35.33MB memory and took 3 seconds to detect
the problem.
5. RELATEDWORK
The closest work related to our approach is by Bhargavan et
al. [3] and by Goubault-Larrecq and Parrennes [18]. Bhargavan et
al. [3] present an approach for verifying protocol implementations
written in F# using ProVerif [4], a theorem prover as the underlying
mechanism. Our work is different in two dimensions: first, we are
verifying protocol implementations written in nesC, and second,
we use symbolic model checker as the underlying technology.
Goubault-Larrecq and Parrennes [18] present an approach for
verifying protocol implementations in C. Their approach models
secrecy properties as reachability properties of the C implementa-
tion and analyzes these properties. A simple pointer analysis tech-
nique is used to keep the verified model as close as possible to
the actual implementation. Unlike our approach that provides sup-
port for the entire nesC language, this approach is useful only for
C implementations; however, the insights described by Goubault-
Larrecq and Parrennes [18] could be used to enhance the underlying
verification technique for Slede.
Besides these two approaches, there is a significant body of re-
search on verifying security protocols but they don’t address chal-
lenges of sensor networks security protcols. The best-known and
influential approach based on Modal logic is that by Burrows,
Abadi and Needham [9], commonly known as the BAN logic. The
key idea is to reason about the state of beliefs among principals in a
system. Some extensions to the BAN logic are also proposed such
as by Oorschot [47].
Meadows developed the NRL protocol analyzer for the analysis
of cryptographic protocols [33]. The NRL protocol analyzer was
used to find flaws in a number of cryptographic protocols including
selective broadcast protocol by Simmons [44], Resource Sharing
Protocol by Burns and Mitchell [8], re-authentication protocol by
Neuman and Stubblebine [39], etc. Longley and Rigby also devel-
oped a tool and demonstrated a flaw in a banking security protocol
[30]. Yet another tool was Interrogater developed by Millen et al.
[35]. Kemmerer [27] used general-purpose formal methods tech-
nique as tools to verify cryptographic protocols. Schneider adapted
the CSP model for verification of security protocols [43]. For a de-
tailed summary of verification techniques, please refer to a survey
by Rubin and Honeyman [42], Meadows [32], Gritzalis et al. [45],
and a more recent survey by Buttyan [10].
Tools for model checking source code directly are also related
to this work. In particular, Blast [21], Bandera [12], Java Path
Finder [20], CMC [36], etc, have successfully verified C and Java
implementations. Like these approaches, Slede also verifies source
code directly; however, unlike these techniques Slede is highly
customized towards model checking security protocol implemen-
tations in nesC.
6. FUTUREWORK
Our approach opens up a number of interesting avenues that we
plan to explore in the future. One such area is analyzing the in-
fluence of non-functional properties, such as memory, bandwidth,
and power constraints on security properties. Sensor nodes are re-
source and bandwidth constrained. It may not be sufficient in this
environment for a node to have an excellent security property at the
cost of depleting system resources. The fitness of a protocol for a
particular purpose is thus also a function of assumptions about the
execution environment. For example, a key management protocol
may distribute the shares of a key polynomial among n neighbors
so that k fragments are required to reconstruct it. This protocol fails
if either l ≥ k nodes are captured or m ≥ n − k nodes run out of
power. Traditional verification mechanisms only assume lost or in-
tercepted messages as failure modes for security protocols making
them inadequate to handle situations like the loss of power situa-
tion above and the effect of other such non-functional properties on
security properties.
Another area of exploration is to design an intermediate language
similar in style to Action language [7], BIR for Bandera [12], etc,
for Slede. Developing this intermediate language representation,
and translating nesC programs will make it easier to incorporate
new model checkers as the backend of Slede.
We also plan to improve on our current prototype. The current
implementation of our verification framework has some limitations
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partly due to the restrictions of the underlying model-checking
technology and due to the specific translation approach that we
have taken. A limitation is on the number of participant nodes in
the verification process. We model a node as a separate process
in PROMELA. The number of these processes are limited, which
limits the number of nodes in Slede’s topology.
There is a large body of work on parameterized model checking
such as by Bouajjani et al. [5], Clarke et al. [11], Emerson and
Namjoshi [15], Henzinger et al. [21], etc that has shown to that it is
possible to scale model-checking to infinite-state systems. Recent
work on BLAST [21] and YASM [19] has shown the viability of
tools that utilize these techniques. In our current prototype, we
have not considered using these abstraction techniques; however,
our future work will include investigations along these directions.
7. CONCLUSION
In this work, we presented Slede our verification framework for
sensor network protocol implementations. The key advantages of
Slede is that it automatically extracts verifiable models from nesC
implementations and allows automatic generation of protocol spe-
cific intrusion models from lightweight annotations. We used Slede
to verify Needham Schroeder’s protocol, and two sensor network
specific protocols. We were able to confirm their flaws using an
automatically generated intrusion model.
Our approach is sound but incomplete in that all traces provided
are real flaws in the implementation with respect to the specified
objectives, but not all flaws in the implementation are provided as
traces. Nevertheless, our experience with verifying some proto-
cols appears to indicate that Slede can be useful for finding crypto-
graphic errors in sensor network security protocols.
Security in sensor networks is an important problem. By bring-
ing the advantages of explicit-state model checking to the nesC
language that is used in a number of wireless sensor network ap-
plications, Slede paves the way to improve the security of these
applications at a small cost.
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